, and I have published more than 700 law review pages on that subject. My interest in this case is simply that of a friend of this Court. 1 v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975), and Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974) , support Petitioner Rodney Class's right to challenge on appeal the constitutionality of the statute he was convicted of violating. Class's claim, like those presented in Menna and Blackledge, would, if successful, forever preclude the state from obtaining a valid conviction against him. This claim should survive his guilty plea.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Menna
1.
In fact, Class's claim should more clearly survive his plea than those of the petitioners in Menna and Blackledge. Unlike the petitioners in those cases, a defendant who establishes the unconstitutionality of his statute of conviction is 2 innocent of any crime. Moreover, this defendant vindicates not only his own right to engage in constitutionally protected conduct but also the rights of others, many of whom might lack the resources, the legal standing, and the courage necessary to protect these rights themselves. A defendant's successful challenge to the statute he is alleged to have violated advances public interests as well as his own.
2.
In habeas corpus proceedings, this Court has long afforded special protection to the right to challenge an unconstitutional statute. Even at a time when habeas petitioners were barred from presenting almost all other constitutional claims, this Court considered claims that petitioners had been convicted of violating unconstitutional statutes. Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879). And when this Court denied full retroactivity to most decisions affording new constitutional protections to criminal defendants, it made an exception for decisions declaring "certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe"-in other words, to decisions declaring substantive criminal statutes invalid. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307 (1989) . Even a post-conviction petitioner who has pleaded guilty without questioning the criminality of his conduct may now obtain the benefit of a subsequent ruling that his conduct was lawful. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998). The Court should afford no less protection to the right to challenge the constitutionality of a statute on direct appeal than it provides in post-conviction proceedings.
3.
The final section of this brief asks the Court not to preclude the possibility of affording greater protection to the right to challenge an allegedly unconstitutional statute than Class seeks here. Since this Court upheld the constitutionality of plea bargaining in 1970, this practice has become more troublesome. Increased sentences reflect both the efforts of prosecutors to gain plea bargaining leverage and the willingness of legislatures to supply it. Trials have become close to nonexistent. Boilerplate waivers that were almost unheard of in 1970 are now commonplace.
Prosecutors might respond to a decision recognizing Class's right to challenge the constitutionality of his statute of conviction by generating more boilerplate. Because Class's plea agreement neither expressly preserved nor expressly waived his right to challenge on appeal the constitutionality of his statute of conviction, his brief characterizes the issue in this case as what the contractual default rule should be. Brief for Pet. at 1, 2, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 35, 38, 44 S. 21 (1974) , this Court held that a guilty plea does not bar a defendant from arguing on appeal or in post-conviction proceedings that he was convicted in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause or that he was prosecuted in retaliation for exercising a procedural right. In this case, Class maintains that his guilty plea should not bar him from challenging on appeal the constitutionality of his statute of conviction. Class's brief shows that, under the standard established by Blackledge and Menna, his claim should survive his plea. Demonstrating the statute's unconstitutionality would block his prosecution in the same way that a successful claim of double jeopardy or vindictive prosecution would.
Following the decisions in Blackledge and Menna, Professor Westin offered the following formula as the best way to reconcile these rulings with earlier decisions that guilty pleas forfeit most claims of antecedent constitutional violations:
[A] defendant who has been convicted on a plea of guilty may challenge his conviction on any ground that, if asserted before trial, would forever preclude the state from obtaining a valid conviction against him, regardless of how much the state might endeavor to correct the defect. In other words, a plea of guilty may operate as a forfeiture of all defenses except those that, once raised, cannot be "cured." Certainly the fact that a defendant's conduct was not a crime should "forever preclude the state from obtaining a valid conviction against him, regardless of how much the state might endeavor to correct the defect," and Class maintains that the statute he has been convicted of violating created no crime. His claim of innocence only makes his case stronger than those of the petitioners in Menna and Blackledge themselves.
Punishing someone for engaging in noncriminal behavior is obviously a grave injustice. Moreover, the public has an especially strong interest in preventing this injustice. Its resources are misspent when the government imprisons people for doing what the Constitution allows them to do. Beyond that, a litigant who establishes the unconstitutionality of a criminal statute vindicates the right of others to engage in behavior like his. When a statute makes this behavior a crime, it may not only chill but freeze the exercise of a constitutional right. Fearing punishment, people are likely to forego exercise of this right. Few may have the courage, the resources, and the legal standing needed to challenge an unconstitutional criminal statute.
Professor Merrill notes that "some constitutional rights are not just private entitlements but also have aspects of public goods. In other words, the exercise of the right not only produces a private benefit for the rights-holder, but also generates positive externalities that benefit third parties or society more generally." Thomas W. Merrill, Dolan v. City of Tigard: Constitutional Rights as Public Goods, 72 Denv. U. L. Rev. 859, 862 (1995) . Merrill uses economic language to explain why courts should be reluctant to find forfeitures of these rights and sometimes should refuse to enforce waivers that have been purchased by granting government benefits: "[I]ndividual valuation of the right will fail to take into account the positive externalities generated by exercise of the right, and thus routine enforcement of . . . waivers-especially on a mass scale . . .-could result in a suboptimal supply of these external benefits." Id.
When a defendant is punished for violating an unconstitutional statute, the injustice to the defendant himself runs deep, and the public interest in correcting this injustice runs deep too. The right that Class asserts merits protection at least as much as the rights vindicated in Menna and Blackledge. As the following section of this brief will show, this Court has long afforded distinctive protection to this right. The Siebold Court reiterated this rule:
II. THIS COURT'S HABEAS CORPUS DECISIONS
[The writ of habeas corpus] cannot be used as a mere writ of error. Mere error in the judgment or proceedings, under and by virtue of which a party is imprisoned, constitutes no ground for the issue of the writ. Hence, upon a return . . . that the prisoner is detained under a conviction and sentence by a court having jurisdiction of the cause, the general rule is, that he will be instantly remanded. . . . The only ground on which this court, or any court, without some special statute authorizing it, will give relief on habeas corpus to a prisoner under conviction and sentence of another court is the want of jurisdiction in such court over the person or the cause, or some other matter rendering its proceedings void. Siebold found a similar lack of authority when a defendant was prosecuted for violating an unconstitutional statute:
The validity of the judgments is assailed on the ground that the acts of Congress under which the indictments were found are unconstitutional. If this position is well taken, it affects the foundation of the whole proceedings. An unconstitutional law is void, and is as no law. An offence created by it is not a crime. A conviction under it is not merely erroneous, but is illegal and void, and cannot be a legal cause of imprisonment. . . . [P]ersonal liberty is of so great moment in the eye of the law that the judgment of an inferior court affecting it is not deemed so conclusive but that . . . the question of the court's authority to try and imprison the party may be reviewed on habeas corpus . . . .
[I]f the laws are unconstitutional and void, the Circuit Court acquired no jurisdiction of the 9 causes. Its authority to indict and try the petitioners arose solely upon these laws. 100 U.S. at 376-77. See also Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 654 (1884) ("If the law which defines the offense and prescribes its punishment is void, the court was without jurisdiction, and the prisoners must be discharged."). (2012) , which held mandatory sentences of life without parole for juveniles unconstitutional. Montgomery declared that "a court has no authority to leave in place a conviction or sentence that violates a substantive rule" and that "no grandfather clause . . . permits States to enforce punishments the Constitution forbids." 136 S. Ct. at 731.
More than a century after Siebold, this Court again gave this right special protection-protection it did not afford to other rights, including those vindicated in Blackledge and Menna. In Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) , the Court adopted the position Justice Harlan previously had taken on the retroactivity of rulings announcing new constitutional rules of criminal procedure. The Court declared that newly announced procedural rules must be applied to all untried cases and all cases on trial or direct review when the rules are announced but that, with two exceptions, these rules do not entitle prisoners whose convictions were final at the time they were announced to habeas corpus relief. 333, 334 (1974) ). Although the petitioner had not argued before trial, at trial, or on appeal that "use" meant active use and although he in fact had pleaded guilty, his default would be excused if he could show that the error in his case had "probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent." Id. at 623. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court, " [O] ne of the principal functions of habeas corpus [is] 'to assure that no man has been incarcerated under a procedure which creates an impermissibly large risk that the innocent will be convicted.'" Id. at 620.
Although both the petitioner in Bousley and Class entered guilty pleas and although both maintained that their conduct was not criminal, Class's case is stronger than that of the petitioner in Bousley in several respects. First, unlike the petitioner in Bousley, Class contends not only that he is innocent but also that his conduct was constitutionally protected-that this conduct was beyond Congress's power to proscribe. Second, unlike the petitioner in Bousley, Class did not default his claim but instead litigated it fully in the district court prior to his guilty plea. Third, unlike the petitioner in Bousley, Class can establish his claim without any expansion of the record. And fourth, unlike the petitioner in Bousley, Class asserts his claim on appeal rather than in a post-conviction proceeding. Post-conviction relief is limited to "persons whom society has grievously wronged," and "an error that may justify reversal on direct appeal will not necessarily support a collateral attack on a final judgment." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 634 (1993) . This Court's special treatment of claims on habeas corpus that a prisoner has been convicted under an unconstitutional statute (and, more recently, of claims that a statute has been held not to reach his conduct) indicates why Class's guilty plea should not bar his appeal in this case.
III. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT PRECLUDE DEFENDANTS WHO PLEAD GUILTY FROM OBTAINING GREATER PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT TO CHALLENGE UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTES THAN CLASS SEEKS IN THIS CASE.
In 1970, in Brady v. United States, 397 U. S. 742 (1970) , this Court upheld the constitutionality of plea bargaining. It declared, "[W]e cannot hold that it is unconstitutional for the State to extend a benefit to a defendant who in turn extends a substantial benefit to the State and who demonstrates by his plea that he is ready and willing to admit his crime and to enter the correctional system in a frame of mind that affords hope for success in rehabilitation over a shorter period of time than might otherwise be necessary." 397 U.S. at 753. Since 1970, however, the plea bargaining process has grown more troublesome.
A. Post-Plea
Challenges to the
Constitutionality of a Defendant's Statute of Conviction Before Brady
This case itself provides a minor indication of how much things have changed. In an earlier era, prosecutors and courts apparently did not imagine that a guilty plea would have the effect the government now proposes to give it.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts anticipated the Menna standard more than a century before Menna and explained why this standard permitted challenges like Class's: "The plea of guilty is, of course, a confession of all the facts charged in the indictment . . . . It is a waiver also of all merely technical and formal objections . . . . But if the facts alleged and admitted do not constitute a crime against the laws of the Commonwealth, the defendant is entitled to be discharged." Commonwealth v. Hinds, 101 Mass. 209, 210 (1869) .
In 1924, a defendant who pleaded guilty appealed his conviction to the Mississippi Supreme Court. Although the defendant did not contend that the statute of his conviction was unconstitutional, the court noticed this statute's unconstitutionality sua sponte and reversed his conviction. A year after Loving, this Court again reviewed and accepted an appellant's contention that he had pleaded guilty to violating an unconstitutional statute-a gun-registration statute that required him to incriminate himself. Justice Harlan's opinion for the Court addressed the issue posed by the present case in a one-sentence footnote: "Petitioner's plea of guilty did not, of course, waive his previous claim of constitutional privilege." Hayes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 87 n.2 (1968) .
B. The Enhanced Power of Prosecutors
The years since Brady have seen harsher sentences, a sharp increase in the number of guilty pleas, the near disappearance of trials, and the explosion of prison populations. In 1970, fewer than 200,000 inmates were confined in state and federal prisons. The rate of incarceration (the number of inmates per 100,000 people) was 96. Today the number of inmates confined in state and federal 127, 128-29 (1995) (declaring that appeal waivers "emerged" "in recent years" and citing decisions in 1982 and 1986 that called these waivers "uncommon" and "not a widespread practice"). But the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure now recognize these waivers, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (b)(1)(N) (requiring courts to determine that a defendant understands "the terms of any pleaagreement provision waiving the right to appeal or to collaterally attack the sentence"), and "[i]n nearly two-thirds of the cases settled by plea agreement in [a federal court] sample, the defendant waived his right to review." Nancy J. (2012) .
After this Court's decisions, however, a former federal prosecutor proposed adding the following language to all plea agreements:
[T]he defendant is aware that defense counsel vary considerably in quality and experience, and that there is no advance guarantee that counsel in this case will give sound or even competent advice . . . . Knowing . . . that he may receive poor advice from his counsel, and that such advice (or failure to advise) may result in an outcome less favorable than he would receive with a typically competent lawyer, the defendant waives any remedy that would involve vacating his conviction or lessening the sentence ultimately imposed, in exchange for the government's agreement to negotiate a disposition of this case. Rev. 673, 706 (2013) . Reservations about this practice nevertheless caution in favor of preserving the ability to litigate issues of special importance to the public-including the constitutional validity of criminal statutes.
CONCLUSION
In cases like Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879), and Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) , this Court has afforded special protection to the right not to be convicted under an unconstitutional statute. The Court should protect this right by allowing Rodney Class to challenge on appeal the constitutionality of the statute he was convicted of violating. The Court should also leave open the possibility of affording this right greater protection than is at issue in this case.
